Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire

The historical information in this book came as quite a surprise to me, even though I consider myself fairly knowledgeable on the subject. The work put into this book is quite extensive and it is well worth reading. I highly recommend it.

For over forty years, I've been reading about the end of World War II and Japan. Were the Japanese ready to surrender? Were the atomic bombs dropped to intimidate the Soviet Union? Was racism the real motive?

Richard Frank's DOWNFALL: THE END OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE EMPIRE, is the best book on this subject I've ever read. Frank takes us back to 1945, and shows what the United States knew then, and how they knew it. Based on the information they had available at the time, the U.S. and British leaders had no reason to believe that the effective leaders of Japan were going to surrender any time soon, or that any alternative course they chose would lead to fewer deaths. Further, he shows that these judgments were correct: there is still no evidence that the effective rulers of Japan would have surrendered in 1945, and all the alternatives to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have definitely led to hundreds of thousands MORE DEATHS of civilians and soldiers.

I regard the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as atrocities and crimes, but the whole of the war was a succession of atrocities and crimes, the greatest bloodbath in history. Frank shows, convincingly, that the use of atomic weapons was the least evil among the choices Harry S Truman faced.

I was moved to reread this fine book by Richard Frank by the allegation by Presidential candidate Senator Barak Obama's former preacher and confidant Jeremiah Wright's that one of America's supposed "sins" that he was cursing it for was the use of the Atomic Bombs on Japan at the end of the Second World War. I was in High School during the Vietnam War period and I recall my teachers telling us that that use of the Bomb was unnecessary and was carried out merely to scare the Communist Soviets and didn't matter anyway since the Japanese were supposedly viewed as "racially inferior". We were taught that the United State government is inherently dishonest, so any such decision to use the bomb must have had "tainted" motiviations. Such cynicism is potentially destructive, as Frank shows in his book.
Attitudes like these have unfortunately become common in the United States over the years, and as Frank points out, are based on ignorance and self-righteousness. President Truman's aide, Admiral Leahy claimed after the war that the use of the bomb was "unnecessary" (Frank points out that there is no record of his opposition at the time the decision was made). This is, of course, true. The Japanese would have eventually surrendered even without the use of the bomb. The question, though, remains "at what cost"? There are two possible scenarios, (1) American and Allied forces invade the Japanes Home Islands in order to force a decision, or (2) no invasion is mounted, but a tight blockade and heavy air bombing keep up the pressure.
Frank shows that although a two-phase invasion was planned, Operation Olympic in Kyushu, followed by Operation Coronet on Honshu near Tokyo, as time passed, American interception and decryption of Japanese messages showed that powerful forces were being brought up to the planned invasion zones along with thousands of aircraft designed for Kamikaze attacks. The civilian population was also being trained to carry out suicide attacks (the government's slogan was "100 Million Die Together"). As a result, American enthusiasm for the invasion scheme waned and, instead, a plan to destroy Japan's railroad system to prevent the distribution of food was developed, which, along with the naval blockade, would bring starvation to the population, forcing the Japanese government to eventually capitulate. The question remained "how long would it take to reach this situation"? Frank points out that over 100,000 Chinese were dying every month during the war, in addition to large numbers of Allied prisoners and forced Asian laborers in southeast Asia. If the war dragged on longer, hundreds of thousands of these people would have died. Had the blockade "succeeded" in bring famine in addition to plague and civil disorder to Japan, hundreds of thousands, if not millions of Japanese would have died.
Frank also points out that something like 350,000 Japanese died in the Soviet campaign to conquer Manchuria, many of them civilians. In addition there were still large Japanese forces in China , the Dutch East Indies (today's Indonesia) and southeast Asia. Without the shock of a surrender brought about by the use of the Atomic bombs it is conceivable that these forces would have continued to fight on (the Japanese Army in China had a history of subordination). There was also a Soviet plan to invade the Japanese home island of Hokkaido. One can only specularte on how many deaths would this have caused, in addition to the possibility that the USSR would have set up a "Japanese Peoples' Republic" in their zone, just like they did in Korea, for which the world is still paying to this day. It is odd that those who show "compassion" for the Japanese people in saying that the bomb shouldn't have been used, seem to lack the same compassion for the oppressed thousands who were dying every day in the Japanese-occupied territories.
Frank also shows that the popular "deus-ex-machina" scenario that supposedly the Japanese government had really made a decision to surrender and were in contact with the USSR government is false. It is true that there were contacts with the Soviets, but they were on a low diplomatic level, and no decision to surrender had been made before the first use of the bomb. In addition, no contacts were made during the three days that passed before the use of the second bomb. It turns out that some Japanese leaders thought the bomb was merely a one-shot affair which the Americans couldn't repeat. Frank shows clearly that America's leaders had no choice but to make the decision they did and that this decision saved untold number of lives, both Allied and Japanese. Anybody who saw the horrific casualties at places like Iwo Jima and Okinawa in addition to the mass suicides of Japanese civilians at Saipana and Okinawa would reach the same conclusion.
Richard Frank is performing an invaluable service in destroying the "politically correct" myths demagogues like Wright are propagating and showing that a clear, open mind leads one to the truth.

Frank has done an excellent job of dispassionately presenting the facts about the endgame of the Pacific War. I appreciate that Frank laid out the evidence and left it to the reader to judge where it pointed.

What is clear from the evidence is that neither the Japanese nor American leadership had adequate information to judge the other's intentions during 1945. In fact, there is some evidence that the Japaneese High Command was being mislead by underlings regarding the state of American morale. Thus the War Council believed that they were just one decisive battle away from being able to negotiate with the Americans for softer terms than Unconditional Surrender. On the other hand, American intelligence community were not adept enough to draw out from the vast array of intercepted cable traffic a clear picture. Thus they did not provide Truman information that was 'actionable'.

As for the bomb, the preponderance of evidence amassed by Frank points to the conclusion that once the decision to build the atomic bomb was made, the Manhattan project took on its own momentum and thus made the bombs use inevitable.

All-in-all a terrific book. Since I finished it on September 30th, it makes it onto my Summer Reading Favorites of 2007 :-)

Richard Frank conclusively shatters a number of myths about the end of the Pacific side of World War II.

First, Japan was NOT ready to accept unconditional surrender, even with the caveat of the preservation of the Japanese throne, until after both bombs were dropped. Frank uses extensive declassified transcripts of Ultra (military) and Magic (diplomatic) U.S. codebreaking to get members of the Japanese war cabinet's own words, or lack thereof, on this issue. Within that is the fact that Japan's attempt to use Russia as an intermediary-ally in negotiations was totally out of tune with reality, so much out of tune that Tokyo actually expected Moscow to honor the full one year's "down time" after abrogating the two countries' neutrality agreement.

Second, the Japanese Army was ramping UP the plans for Keisu-Go, the all-out defense of the Japanese homeland, after the spring firebombings of Tokyo and elsewhere. Top Army brass considered that the U.S. might well try blockade, and thought it had enough kamikazes, midget submarines, etc., to make the U.S pay enough a price for even the blockade that it would settle for a negotiated peace. Again, Frank looks in-depth at Magic and Ultra transcripts to show how much support there was for this.

Third, Frank demonstrates that U.S. casualty fears of an invasion of Kyushu were well-warranted and may even have been understated in some cases.

The determination of the Japanese Empire to resist was well-known by American troops in the Pacific who had seen the Japanese, on average, take 97 percent casualties in many of their defensive actions. A militaristic government was ready to exploit this to the death.

The atomic bomb was therefore used for reasons of the highest seriousness. It was NOT dropped on Hiroshima as a demonstration for Stalin. And, speaking of demonstrations, the fact that it took two atomic bombs on Japan to get it to surrender puts the lie to the idea that a "demonstration" bomb would have been enough to get the Japanese to a non-negotiated surrender with them attempting to hold on to territory.