The Last Word (Philosophical Essays)

In this lucid, compact and profound volume the always incisive philosopher Thomas Nagel goes about defending the very thing that makes philosophy possible: reason. Reason has been under attack of late. Whether it be deconstructionist continental nonsense (usually of the Gallic variety) or reductionist empiricism (think Richard Dawkins) reason itself has been a whipping boy in the intellectual community. In forceful prose Nagel reasserts the primacy of classical reason to all human understanding and thought; the variety in which he reasserts his basic argument is both convincing and creative. It's somewhat sad that the relativist, reductionist status quo of the academy forced this classical defense by this modern enlightenment thinker. Though his other work, like the brilliant "Mortal Questions", shed more light on his philosophical preoccupations, this work in many ways elucidates the structure in which Nagel attacks all his philosophical quandaries. One interesting result of this books thesis, one that goes slightly ignored in the text, is the metaphysical implications of the existence of reason in a "naturalistic world." An unabashed atheist, Nagel is, nonetheless, perplexed by reason's ontological status and even describes his acceptance of reason as "Spinoza-istic." The reality of reason in a evolved species is an interesting problem and perhaps one for future study, but the point of "the last word" is to reassert the NECESSARY primacy of reason to any and all judgements. I found it utterly convincing.

Poor guy just does not seem to understand that this debate is merely an eternal circle. An unending battle between propositional "polar opposites" that ultimately emanate from the same plane of philosophical thought about the world and the nature of reality. The barn door was busted open long ago and he, nor any of his "rationalist" cohorts, can ever close the door much less get the horse back in again. Intellectuals should move their debates to more interesting areas wherein some real discussions may take place, not nasty little polemics like this.

Ostensibly, Nagel's work is an assault on extreme relativism/subjectivism. On another level, it complements Nozick's "Nature of Rationality" (while rightly attacking Nozick's misuse of evolutionary principles). If extreme relativism/subjectivism were the sole objective, Nagel could have defeated it with a single statement: "All truth/logic/science/ethics is relative/subjective," is self-refuting (which Nagel cites).

But the rationalist Nagel really has a stronger objective. He rightly wants to insist that constructivist/subjectivist/relativist (he uses "perceptivist") claims against reason, logic, science, and ethics are embedded in the very criteria they want to deny, and worse, their efforts to use external criteria "to get outside" to challenge these claims is (1) impossible (because they use the very tools they criticize), or (2) untenable, because they use irreducible principles in one category to assault irreducible principles in another, or Ryle's "category mistake (misuse)," (3) implausible, because they substitute less plausible hypotheses to assault rationally and empirically more plausible hypotheses, or (4) two or more of the preceding three. Except for ethics, his observations are valid.

The chapter on ethics is more elusive and certainly inconclusive. He begins with ethics as a species of practical reason, itself a feature of decision-theory, which is distinctly non-instrumental (a controversial claim, he concedes), that requires "reasons" (i.e., justifications). Except for the "non-instrumental" claim, there is nothing controversial thus far. Everything that follows, however, seems lost. He begins denying Hume's "pleasure/pain" motivation of ethics, raises the empathy factor (Hume, Smith), admits emotions (typically non-rational) are often involved (Hume, Smith), as are other "background" information (Mill, Bentham), that "impartiality" is one of its features (all but virtue theory), as is the "universifiability" of the action (deontological, consequentialist), then gives a concrete consequentialist example, followed by a concrete deontological example, of "reason," then concedes he isn't sure where all this leads. I assume this exercise was meant to instantiate that agents act for "reason(s)," but the "reasons" are intended to satisfy individual integrity for having acted.

The final chapter is a series of ruminations, something about naturalism not becoming a religion, Nozick's (mis)use of Darwinism as an escape hatch, and a reminder that the natural world and our use of it also necessarily includes us in it (a dominant theme throughout).

Nagel reinforces Nozick's point about rationality being inherently circular, but according to Nagel that is simply necessary and unavoidable (not an objection). The principal idea is the individual's inability to escape his embeddedness, much less his ability to approach his perspectives "outside" them is both impossible and undesirable, and why these facts repudiate extreme subjectivism/relativism. Most philosophy students already know this. Most in postmodernism and the humanities don't, and they will most benefit from this book.

Nagel's claim is that those who argue against reason must use reason and thus automatically invalidate their claims. But the threat posed by subjective deflationsists is more comprehensive and robust than that. For the most popular "argument" for subjectivism is not very rational at all. It is more like an ad hominem. It suggests something like, "reason is just an unfashionable and unjustifiable manifestation of the will-to-power."

The Enlightenment made Reason fashionable. Deflationists don't necessarily want to defeat reason its own terms. They simply want to make Reason and its Pretensions upopular. Then we will all have to end all statements with "of course, that's just what I think personally."

I think that Nagel in right in saying that those who are resolutely rational cannot get outside of the heavier claims of reason, or even the lighter ones. The danger is that people may simply cease to reason at all. Assuming that that is a danger and not a liberation.

Unfortunately, it would probably take entire squadrons of Fighting Nagels to stem the subjectivist tide. Which means that the Last Word may be a scream instead of a rational argument. But "The Last Word" is certainly an honest try by an honest guy. Buy it before it becomes illegal.

This is classic Nagel. He is one of the most important philosophers in America today. And his philosophical prose style clearly demonstrates why that is the case: it is clear, direct, and straightforward. This text (along with Mortal Questions and A View From Nowhere) would be a great Intro. to Philosophy text; it is a superb example of how analytic philosophy should be written. There are actually arguments here. Imagine that.

Yes, the text bashes various forms of relativism and subjectivism (in favor of "objective facts" and "objective values"). But possibly the most important chapter is titled, "Logic." Read this chapter. I won't ruin the sunset ending for you.

I highly recommend this text. As well as: Searle, Mind, Language, Society; and Nozick, Invariances.