Knowledge in a Social World

In his earlier book Epistemology and Cognition (Harvard University Press, 1986), Alvin I. Goldman sketched a distinction between individual and social epistemology, offered his own account of the former, and promised a sequel devoted to the latter. Knowledge in a Social World is that sequel, and offers a systematic treatment of social epistemology. It is original not only in substance but in conception, opening up whole new avenues of epistemological investigation. As Goldman treats it, social epistemology "is linked to those social science and policy disciplines that study knowledge in its social and institutional contexts." (ix) His aim is to offer a social theory of knowledge, which takes full account of "the interpersonal and institutional contexts in which most knowledge endeavors are actually undertaken" (vii); and, in light of the fact that "social practices can make both positive and negative contributions to knowledge," aims "to show just which social practices, under what conditions, will promote knowledge rather than subvert it." (viii) The book is a tour de force: wide-ranging, ambitious and challenging. It is engagingly written: non-technical, exceedingly clear, and witty. It treats a wide range of social domains and practices, including science, education, law, testimony, and argumentation. It uses examples deftly and tellingly; its arguments are consistently powerful. One couldn't ask for a better demonstration of the relevance of epistemology to a broad range of social and policy issues. Those who disagree with Goldman's conclusions, and his recommendations for truth-enhancing practices, will have to confront this book. It is a must-read for scholars from the gamut of disciplines that treat the issues it addresses, and to the intelligent non-specialist as well.

In this path-breaking book, Alvin Goldman brings academic epistemology to bear on important real world issues in information technology, the media, science, law, politics, and education. The motivating idea of the book is simple: Knowledge (in the weak sense of true belief) is important. Social institutions and practices can and should be evaluated on how well or how poorly they contribute to true belief. Taken as a whole, this book is one of the most effective explanations in the philosophical literature of why truth matters, both theoretically and in practice. This book is not for everyone. Its careful attention to evidence and its sustained philosophical argument demand the full attention of the reader. But unlike many other types of academic philosophy, here the evidence and argument are brought to bear on fascinating real world issues, including policies for freedom of speech, publishing on the World Wide Web, the adversary system of justice, political campaign fundraising, and proposals for curricular change in education. The depth and breadth of Goldman's knowledge on the variety of issues that he discusses is remarkable. In addition to presenting and defending Goldman's own well-thought-out positions on the issues, the book as a whole provides a powerful philosophical response of the theoretical excesses of deconstructionists, postmodernists, social constructionists and extreme pragmatists on these issues. My one reservation about the book is that, for a book in social epistemology, it sometimes tends to be overly individualistic. For example, Goldman's discussion of the jury system pays more attention to the evidence on the cognitive limitations of individuals than to the evidence of how juries as a group are often able to compensate for those individual cognitive limitations. But this is only a matter of emphasis. In his discussion of other examples (e.g., the scientific community), Goldman does highlight ways that the group can correct for individual cognitive limitations. If you identify academic epistemology with the intellectual project of conceptual analysis-for example, the attempt to discover necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge-you should read this book. Goldman shows how epistemology can be much more relevant to real world social issues than you might ever have imagined.

I must agree with the review that appeared this week in the TLS (Times Literary Supplement, London, 27.01.00), which managed to describe the book without talking about the social character of knowledge - except to say that Goldman has a 'dirigiste' view of how knowledge should be controlled and communicated in society. His own euphemism is 'epistemic paternalism', and readers might want to judge for themselves what it all means, once the dogmatic philosophising and gratuitous formalising is removed. This reader found the implications rather scarey, though luckily this philosophical stuff rarely gets beyond the seminar room. A definite step from back (and away) from Fuller's work on social epistemology - and even more conservative types like Kitcher and Longino.