Thank You for Arguing: What Aristotle, Lincoln, and Homer Simpson Can Teach Us About the Art of Persuasion

This is a useful, well-written book focusing on using the tools of rhetoric to persuade people of things. It's different from most books on rhetoric by emphasizing contemporary, realistic examples - trying to get a promotion, win a client, make a sale, convince someone to vote a certain way - and by focusing on how people really decide things, not on idealistic versions of that. Thus, the author does a very good job of discussing why "decorum", fitting in, is important, and how it is important to know what motivates the other person. And it's different from books on psychology and people-skills, like How to Win Friends and Influence People, because it focuses mainly on rhetoric.

The writing is anecdotal and personal, full of jokes, some of them funny, and references to pop culture. I felt the second half of the book became a bit disorganized - it was sometimes not precisely clear to me whether the author was discussing logos, pathos, or ethos, or exactly where a chapter fit into the big scheme of things. But it's certainly well-written.

And the book is unquestionably useful, both in identifying and in using rhetorical techniques. Frankly, I wish I'd had this book when I was younger: I used to think persuasion was based entirely on logic. There are many day-to-day interactions and even career decisions that would be greatly aided by knowing the material here.

Although the book is entertaining, useful, even important, I nevertheless had a couple complaints.

(1) There were a number of errors in the identification and naming of rhetorical figures. Although these errors were likely just due to sloppy editing, I felt they would substantially confuse most readers.

For example, "metonymy" is defined on page 213 as something that "uses a part to describe the whole." True, using a part for a whole can be a type of metonymy, but metonymy actually means using something associated with another thing to stand for that other thing. The glossary repeats the incorrect definition, but concedes that metonymy can mean using cause for effect. Again, that is a type of metonymy, not metonymy itself.

Similarly, synecdoche is also misdefined as that "which swaps one thing for a collection." (p. 213). Synecdoche is using a part for the whole. Saying "The White House denied the allegations" would be a metonymy, not a synecdoche as the author incorrectly claims, because "White House" is not a part of the presidential administration.

The author also argues on page 210 that "every verse in the first book of Genesis" after the first starting with "And" is an example of anaphora. I think most people would say "chapter" not "book" of Genesis, but leaving that aside, I don't think anaphora is the correct figure here, if anything it is polysyndeton. The "and"s are not emphasized, they are just connecting words. (This point is fairly clear when we think of the meaning of anaphora, which is to emphasize the repetition, but in the Hebrew it's even clearer - the "And" comes from the Hebrew prefix vav- and isn't even its own word, it's just sort of a grammatical linking word.

The author makes the same error on page 211, mischaracterizing an example from Monty Python and the Holy Grail as anaphora when it is better characterized as polysyndeton.

On page 196 the author does correctly define polysyndeton, but the example next to it seems like an example of asyndeton. The editing is unclear but the treatment is at best confusing and at worst incorrect.

The author claims that "a man who wants to sound like a Rat Packer uses a speak-around when he refers to woman as 'broads'." By "speak-around" the author means "circumlocution" or periphrasis, but using "broad" for "woman is not an example of this. It's not even close, frankly, I'm not sure what the author was even getting at, since he correctly defines periphrasis. (p. 210). By the way, this also illustrates the author's penchant for using his own pet terms for rhetorical terms of art, here "speak-around" for "periphrasis." I find this annoying, jargon is there for a reason, so that people do not have to constantly redefine their terms and can look things up easily, but he does it a lot.

(2) My general philosophical concern with the author's approach is that he comes perilously close to confusing persuasiveness with correctness. It is true that the author's repertoire of techniques are ultimately persuasive to most people, but that's just because most people are not trained in statistical inference and logic and are thus subject to various kinds of cognitive fallacies. But this persuasiveness is not related to the actual correctness of the arguments. At one point the author mentions "formal logic" but does not seem to mean real logic, i.e. mathematical logic, by that; and the author does not generally seem to realize that only by quantitative analysis can correct decisions be arrived at - what he calls "logic" is Aristotlean logic, and there have been considerable developments in logic since Aristotle's time. Of course, the author has no doubt been very successful with his techniques, but I am not sure he fully realizes that what he is doing is not related to actual truth.

(3) The danger of the author's philosophy is apparent in several rather distracting comments throughout the book. Generally, the problem with being persuasive like the author is that he is going to confuse what is popular or widely-believed with what is correct.

(3a) This fallacy is probably most clearly exemplified on page 174, when the author suggests that a politician who votes donor's interests instead of public opinion should not be voted for. As the author puts it, "when the candidate says 'I don't just vote the opinion polls' what she really means is 'I prefer special interests to voters' interests.' ". The flaw here is that the author is conflating public opinion (as measured by opinion polls) with voters' interests. But many issues, most issues in fact, are much too complex for voters to have informed opinions about. The idea of a republican form of government is that representatives with greater time and resources to study the issues can determine what is in voters' interests. Donors who agree with the politician's will of course support her, but these facts alone don't show the politician is acting against voters' interests.

The point is that an opinion poll, or an opinion, is highly relevant to someone like the author who is very interested in persuading people. But it's not that relevant to actual fact.

(3b) Similarly, on page 129 and elsewhere the author constantly confuses or conflates "intelligent design" and "creationism", particularly in a passage arguing that intelligent design should not be taught. But creationism is different from intelligent design, creationism typically referring to a young Earth theory that rarely makes pretensions to being scientific, and intelligent design another theory that does claim to be scientific. The fact that most people do not realize that creationism is distinct from intelligent design (although of course there are claims that the latter is an intellectual descendant of the former) is not a reason to conflate the two.

(3c) On page 183 the author suggests, although he does not directly state, that a Supreme Court justice should have "phronesis" or practical wisdom, and he seems to praise Justices Breyer and O'Connor for being "deliberative thinkers" and for their "practical wisdom." But it's far from clear that, popular opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, the role of Supreme Court Justice should be one of "practical wisdom." Rather, some might argue that the main role of a Supreme Court justice is to ensure that statutes and case law are decided in accordance with the Constitution. In conjunction with the large number of political statements in the book, the author seems to be advocating a legislative role for justices. Perhaps, however, I am reading too much into that paragraph - still, in conjunction with large number of somewhat tendentious political positions the author advocates in the book, it's not unreasonable to make such an inference.

(3d) On page 110, he notes "When President Clinton told the special prosecutor, 'That depends on what your definition of 'is' is' he was redefining a term - in the slickest, most lawyerly way, unfortunately."

There are a whole slew of problems with this statement.

First, the author misquotes Clinton. Clinton said "meaning" not "definition" and "upon" not "on". The reason this is important is that it shows the author, like in all the cases above, is not independently checking facts, and is not having anyone else do it for him. He just sort of assumes that what most people believe, is the case, or he does not care. But if someone is going to accuse a former president of the United States of deceiving or trying to deceive the court, he ought to fact check the quote.

Second, contrary to what most people think, the word "is" is ambiguous. Suppose for example that John and Mary have an intimate relationship, but it has ended two years before. Suppose someone asks John "Is there an intimate relationship between you and Mary?" The answer depends on what the definition of the word "is" is.

Third, Clinton was not trying to evade a statement he made. Clinton was asked about his own lawyer's statements in a prior proceeding. Clinton was asked if he agreed with his lawyer's statement. Now, Clinton is not deceiving anyone, because he clearly states that under one definition of "is" he agrees with his lawyer, and another he does not.

In conclusion, there is indeed much useful and much entertaining here. And without a doubt the author has his finger on the pulse of humanity (well, his comments criticizing abbreviations in IM already seem dated, but besides that). And without a doubt, the overwhelming majority of readers, if any, will not be in the least put off by any of the concerns I raise. So I think all-in-all it's a good book to read it you want to persuade people of things.

This book is fun and pretty interesting but your opinion will probably depend on your level of interest in the topic. I got this book after listening to some podcast lectures on rhetoric and wanted to know more. The book uses a lot of pop culture and everyday life examples to relate the topics. This is nice as it makes it a lighter read but at the same time it can be a bit too light. You get a good overview of rhetoric and it gives you things to think about but if you really wanted to learn the topic in any depth or improve your skills I would suggest also getting a more in depth/scholarly book. This is a fun book though and the nature of it allows you to skip around without missing too much.

After stumbling on to this book I found that I was pleasantly surprised by the depth and usefulness of the book. I found, as well, that coupling this book with the book "Logical self-defense" added to the knowledge and understanding of the topic. Both delve into the topic of argumentation but from a different perspective. The Thank you for Arguing book is a good compilation of ideas and practices for everyday use while the Logical self-defense book is probably geared more towards lawyers or people who are studying the subject. In Conclusion :), I would recommend getting both books.

This is a not so scholarly list of rhetorical techniques. It is humorous, superficial and like a salesman's seminar

Jay Heinrichs comes across as a right lowlife, a despicable human who fits in well with our 20th/21st century culture (codes of conduct, codified law) and he is.

As a contemporary Machiavelli, Heinrichs teaches you to get what you want through relativistic ethics -- ends justify means; if it feels good, do it; as long as I get my way.

Page after page, you shall read how he passed his kind of beliefs onto his children.

With this, you shall come to see why narcissistic creeps who are adept at group dynamics fill contemporary life in the USA, UK and elsewhere in the "West". After all, today's adults are yesterday's children -- children raised by lowlifes like Heinrichs.

In short, Heinrich holds deception and lying as the pinnacle achievements which we should strive to achieve to get our wants.

Heinrichs explains in contemporary language how to deceive and trick others using the methods espoused by the corrupt, immoral peoples of Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome.

Heinrichs gives you the names of these methods using both their Classical words and his own contemporary fashions.

Even if you do not yearn to become a deceiver like Heinrichs, you should read this book for it shall teach you how to defend yourself from the millions of narcissistic lowlifes who suffer from relativistic ethics.

By putting a light to the ways of the treacherous wicked, you can better support your moral absolutism.