Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution

A lot of myth surrounds the American founding. It is not uncommon for many to see a continuum from the Declaration to the Constitution with liberty, freedom, and democracy being solidified along the way. But the exhilaration and potential for empowerment felt in 1776 had largely dissipated by the middle 1780s, as well as the commonality of purpose between elites and others. The defeat of England brought with it economic and political discord. This book discusses at length the economic hard times that were pervasive in the thirteen states dating at least from the last battle of the Revolutionary War in 1781, the attempts to deal with those problems ranging from self-help to legislation, and the impact of those developments on calling for a constitutional convention and the subsequent provisions of the US Constitution.

The states under the Articles of Confederation were not on a sound financial footing when the War broke out. The currency, certificates, bonds, etc that were issued to pay soldiers and buy supplies greatly depreciated over the next several years. In addition, the hard money supply dried up. Upon discharge, soldiers were forced to sell their certificates at steep discounts to speculators. Both creditors and bondholders insisted on payment of debts and interest on bonds. State governments raised taxes primarily to pay that interest.

Farmers and artisans, especially in light of a lack of circulating currency, were faced with both debts and taxes that they could not pay. Widespread foreclosures and confiscation of property administered by local sheriffs were the result. But those middling folks felt more victimized than deficient in compliance. The huge rate of return that speculators got on discounted bonds was especially irksome. The people living mostly in the western part of the states forcibly obstructed courts, sheriffs, and auctions and demanded that legislatures give some measure of debt and tax relief, as well as reintroduce paper money. Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786/87 is the foremost example of citizen self-help.

The ineffectualness of the Articles of Confederation coupled with what elites saw as irresponsibility and too much democracy on the part of average people and state assemblies precipitated a constitutional convention in May, 1787. The author discusses the balancing act of the elites of the Convention (virtually all lawyers, merchants, and large landowners) in curtailing democracy while appearing to secure it. For example, the provision for people electing members of the lower house of Congress was offset by large electoral districts, which diminishes the potential impact of interest groups, like debt-ridden farmers. Although states could no longer issue currency or give relief to debtors, the newly established right of the federal government to collect import taxes greatly reduced onerous individual tax burdens. Most of the Convention delegates were more concerned with what provisions could get through the state ratifying conventions, than any particular concern for democracy.

The book is a corrective to the usual discussions on the Constitution making process. The author is not concerned with day-to-day Convention affairs. His concern is with the underlying economic and political situation leading to the Convention and the general thinking of the delegates. The detailing of the financial hard times consumes much of the book but is a bit muddled, scattered, and repetitious, but nonetheless is informative. Also, it seems that the author overstates the impact that the people had on the final version of the Constitution, despite any unruliness. The founders actually made few concessions to democracy. The anti-Federalists hardly took up the cause of democracy; they were from the same class as the Federalists, but preferred to exercise their power on a state level.

Woody Holton's previous book, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia (Omohundro Institute of Early American History & Culture), is a classic account of the coming of the American Revolution. Here, Holton carries his story from Independence to the Ratification of the U.S. Constitution, and in fine style.

The form of the federal Constitution owes much to the role played in American politics and society in the 1770s and '80s by common folk, particularly debtors and taxpayers, Holton demonstrates. Peter S. Onuf and Herbert Sloan noted decades ago that James Madison's desire for federal reform owed much to his inability to contend with Patrick Henry at the state level, and the merit of Holton's book is to prove that Madison was far from alone. The Federalist movement of those years was in opposition to the heavy democratization of state governments that resulted from the American Revolution.

Check the headlines: the Federal Government is in many ways impervious to public opinion. (Polls have shown that people opposed the Bush-Bernanke Billionaire Bailout and that they've wanted the U.S. out of Iraq for several years.) Holton demonstrates that, at least insofar as leading nationalists in Philadelphia were concerned, it was supposed to be that way.

I think that Holton errs in equating nationalists with the Philadelphia Convention as a whole -- that is, in not noting the significance of Madison's defeats on several important issues in Philadelphia. For him, Madison's convention defeats were simple tactical adjustments, and the omission of provisions he favored was mere window-dressing for the achievement of elitist goals by other means. He seems to buy the idea of a Platonic ideal of the Constitution that is different from the version of it that the people were sold in the ratification dispute. (For that argument, see The Politically Incorrect Guide(tm) to the Constitution (Politically Incorrect Guides)).

While I disagree with him there, Holton's account is well worth reading. It shows readers that the main line of Federalist thought, which ultimately achieved dominance through the agency of John Marshall's Supreme Court, represented the betrayal of the American Revolution. Let us hope that he doesn't stop at that conclusion, but follows this argument into the nineteenth century.

The general story told in school - original US articles of confederation weak, needed to form a strong national government, Constitution created. Everyone happy. Rah rah rah. As in most stories like this, the actual tale of the formation of a new government is trickier, with multiple factions and views involved.
Most of the US constitution issues involves debt structures and taxation, which are complex issues, particularly since 18th century finance was a little different than current issues. The author takes on communicating this complex task admirably. His thesis, that the constitution ended up a balance of the defense of elitist economic interests and individual rights for all, particularly with the insistence of the addition of the bill of rights.
The overall tone of the book, though with a alternate version of history, is surprisingly not harsh, rather breezy, and sometimes amusing.
I highly recommend this book along with more traditional texts regarding the creation of the US constitution.

This history, told mostly from the vantage point of the average colonial American, rather than from the traditional vantage point of the landed gentry, has a lot to offer in untwisting the mythology of how our Constitution came about.

It is basically a story about the chaos that ensued when all the contending forces -- from the grassroots upwards are thrown into the mix; and all side's views and interests are taken into account. What ensued in 1787 was not a pretty picture. That the author was able to capture this unruliness is a tribute to his skill, and in the end is a much fuller, much more honest and thus a more believable history than the sugarcoated version we have come to accept and revere as the true national story.

Woody Holton is not the first, the only, nor will he be the last historian to note that our founding fathers were an aristocratic and very much anti-democratic bunch, who were as careful and skillful at protecting their own economic interests as they were concerned about shaping a "people's democracy" through the details of the Constitution. And while this book does not go so far as to suggest that the overlapping interests of the landed gentry amounted to a silent reactionary conspiracy, as Charles Beard does in his "An Economic Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution," or as Howard Zinn leaves hanging in the air in his "A People's History of the United States," it does leave plenty of room for the careful reader to draw his own speculative conclusions.

The crux of the matter (and of the book) is that due to the rebellious attitudes and actions of the average colonial citizen, the framers (representing the interests mostly of the landed gentry) were worried about the post-revolutionary slide into "a real people's democracy." Without the heavy-handed intervention of the framers, the average colonial Joe-blow would have exercised an even greater influence over state and national policies than that granted them by the compromises that eventually ended in the Constitution that we now have. Whether the alternative would have been better than what we have, is arguable.

Correctly, Holton makes these average colonial citizens, the real "unsung heroes" of the Constitution, as it was their tenacity and forbearance, their refusal to be dictated to and looked down upon, their agitation in the streets as often as necessary to defend what they viewed as their inherent rights and interests that led to the Constitution we now have. Shay's rebellion is just the most "written about" of the many rebellions that took place during those very hectic times.

As one would expect, most of the debate, and the subtext of the competing interests, were shrouded in economic complexity, arcania and details of that era. For it is at this level that the democracy we have come to enjoy really gets played out. Altogether, Horton's rendition makes us better understand why we are still caught up in the same time warp, with the moneyed interests still exercising undue influence over national policy. Pulling this off without leaving the reader with the feeling that he had an axe to grind was no mean trick, and makes for very interesting reading to boot. Five Stars

Imagine this conundrum; governments, both state and national, pay their debts and bills with bonds, scrip, and promissory notes instead of hard currency or gold and silver coin. And then these same governments turn around and demand tax payments to themselves in hard currency or gold ONLY.(And very HIGH tax payments to boot!)

As one might intuit, this scenario is a prescription for financial distress if not out right rebellion and this is precisely what occurred in the thirteen states during the period when the Articles of Confederation were in effect. Mobs of ex-soldiers and foreclosed upon taxpayers laid siege to state legislatures demanding relief [p.148], closed courts to prevent foreclosures, and otherwise engaged in massive grass root resistance to tax collection efforts [p.153]. The worst of it being the Shay's Rebellion in western Massachusetts in 1786 [p.11].

Holton's thesis is that the economic elites of the new American state were terrified by all this and set out to take the people's hands off the levers of power to the greatest extent possible. It sure didn't hurt that many, many of the constitution's proponents (and their families and friends) were bondholders, creditors, and land speculators either, notes Holton, who follows in the "Cui Bono" school of economic history and is solidly in the tradition of An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of The United States by Charles A. Beard (1913) and People's History of the United States: 1492 to Present (P.S.) by Howard Zinn (1980) [p.157].

The constitution that the ruling elites foisted on the American people to supplant the Articles says Holton, "...managed to construct a national government that was considerably less democratic than even the most conservative of the state constitutions" [p.211].

Some of the previous reviewers have made the criticism that Holton should have explained the arcana of institutional debt arrangements of those days better. I disagree. Holton explains these things well enough for most laymen to understand and going into greater detail would only interrupt the narrative flow to no great benefit.

I recommend this book as did the National Book Award nomination committee which selected it as one of the finalists for 2007.