Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb

Reading a book like this for me is a bit of a disappointment. It seems that the author started out with the idea that the A-Bombs were bad and sought to justify his beliefs rather than take an objective look at the evidence. In my opinion there are much better books out there that lay out the facts and let you draw your own conclusions.

In a nutshell the author postulates that the Japanese were just about starved out, were worn down, and were ready to throw up their hands in surrender at the first sight of American troops on Japanese soil.

IMHO, nothing could be further from the truth. The Japanese were not used to losing wars, and their multi-generational Bushido code called for death to the last man rather than surrender. This code was being adhered to rigorously throughout the war, and as American invasions came closer to the home islands (ie Okinawa & Iwo Jima) the suicide code was adhered to almost exclusively. Further, based on the civilian suicide training being ramped up as American forces drew nearer there is little evidence to suggest that they would have surrendered as meekly as the author seems to suggest. The Japanese public was being spoon fed false news of great successes which buoyed their false hopes for ultimate victory, as well as news of the atrocities Americans would commit upon them in time of invasion. Given these factors (and many others) along with the fanatical Kamikaze spirit that had already been continuously demonstrated, I don't think the Japanese would have given up as easily as the author does.

This book is quite fascinating. What Skates has done is write a history of the planning for the invasion of Japan. The invasion never happened; the planning did. What he is doing is exploring the alternatives to the use of the atomic bomb that U.S. leaders thought they had before them in 1945.

Skates explores all sorts of plans including airpower, deception, the possibility of employing special weapons (everything ranging from missiles to chemical weapons) and the planned inclusion of British, Australian, and Canadian troops. What he finds is that the invasion never was considered an alternative. It was going to happen. American policy makers always intended to use BOTH atomic weapons against Japan and then invade. In explaining his decision to use the atomic bomb rather than invade, President Harry S. Truman was making things up. It never an either/or choice for the United States. This book was published in 1994 and became hugely controversial in 1995 as part of the crisis over the "Enola Gay" display at the Smithsonian Institute. He found that planners never expected the one million dead that Truman used to explain his decision. There were a number of figures floating around, but at worst it was 124,935 casualties (both dead and wounded). "While there is little evidence except assertion and repetition to support the huge numbers used by Truman and Stimson after the war, the U.S. leaders, both civilian and military, were extremely conscious of the costs of Okinawa and reluctant to repeat those loses" (p. 82).

Many revisionists have attempted to use Skates's study to argue against the use of the atomic bomb because of the low numbers. In interviews, Skates has said that he does not believe the general revisionist claims that Japan was trying to surrender, believing that the evidence argues to the contrary.

Skates believes that invading Japan would have been preferable to dropping nuclear weapons. He spends most of the book describing how the invasion would have happened. He does admit that there would have been problems with the invasion. For instance, over half of the divisions would have come from Europe, however, most of the combat veterans in these units were being discharged and replaced with new draftees. Retaining the veterans would have caused severe morale problems.

Skates' main argument is that an invasion would have caused fewer casualties than died in the nuclear bombing. I believe he fails to sustain this argument. The War Department staff in Washington estimated there would be 250,000 to 500,000 American casualties in an invasion of Japan. After the war, some politicians casually made this a "half-million dead" and then "a million dead." In any event, the estimate of casualties included killed, wounded and missing. The original estimates were a not-unreasonable figure based on American experience with fanatical Japanese defenders of the Philippines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and one which a postwar examination of Japanese plans for the defense of the Home Islands bore out. There was no indication the Japanese would fight any less strenuously if their Home Islands were invaded. Indeed, it was a safe bet that the fighting would have been even more costly. And this doesn't even consider the Japanese casualties.

The Japanese consistently demonstrated a marked reluctance to surrender, either on the battlefield or at the negotiating table. The American people, in light of Germany's surrender in May 1945, were eager to get the war in the Pacific over with as soon as possible. The voters were making this wish quite clear to their elected officials and the chief among these, President Truman, was listening intently. He had been told that a blockade of Japan might have to go on for a year or more before Japan finally gave in. A successful invasion would not be noticeably shorter. The American people would have none of this and wanted something done. Nuclear weapons were simply another incentive for the Japanese to surrender, and no one was sure they would be any more persuasive than the fire bomb raids (which killed more people than the atomic bombs).

This book is a really thorough look at the Allied (American) plans for the invasion of Japan. What is valuable is the perspective in which these plans were developed, from the start of the war right up to the Japanese surrender. I would have liked more detail on the nitty gritty of the Japanese plans. The big picture perspective from the Japanese standpoint was outstanding, in my opinion. The Japanese had really studied American tendencies and the US troops would have faced a very hot reception on Kyushu during Operation Olympic. I'm sure there will be people who disagree with Mr. Skate's assertion that if Kyushu were taken, actually not if but when and with how many casualties, taking Tokyo would have been relatively easy. But Mr. Skates seems to back up this claim with facts gleaned from the historical record. The book is somewhat of a dry read, but very informative. Highly recommend!

Advertised as an alternative to the Atomic Bombs released on Japan to end World War II, Skates spends most of the thesis explaining military capabilities, background of contemporary leaders along with government and public opinion concerning the end of the war. As little as two chapters actually deal with alternatives. While the background is vital in understanding the options, more time could have been utilized to further develop alternatives. Skates uses a certain degree of presentism to disclaim the decision of the bombs to end the war. Despite flaws, argument of alternative well expressed and researched.