War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945

Eye opener! Really connects known history of the Pacific War in WWII to the unknown history of pre-war American naval planning. Demonstrates that American Pacific "grand strategy" in WWII was well thought out as a result of 40 years of debate and discussion within the US Navy and with the US Army. Almost every key Admiral and most senior staff officer in the US Navy had worked on Plan Orange at least once, and often many times before 1941. Although the details of the real fighting were usually different than conceived in the pre-war plans, the general circumstances were remarkably similar. Thus, grant strategy in the Pacific War was more effective due to the huge amount of study and reflection that occurred in the years preceding the conflict. Nice counter-example to the normal "fighting the last war" syndrome so common in most pre-war war planning histories. The US Navy and US Army really were intellectually prepared for the War in the Pacific. Once they had the equipment and people they needed to fight, the outcome was all but foregone.

The connection between technology and operational plans is discussed as well. War Plan Orange evolved, and included provisions for future evolution, based on technology available at the time. As aircraft, submarine, and ship capabilities (mostly range) improved, planning changed to accommodate.

A good companion book is "Agents of Innovation", which profiles the US Navy's General Board in the 1920's.

From what I have read, it is the most important secondary source available regarding the evolution of American prewar plans for the Pacific. Researching this subject matter is of critical importance to understanding the unfolding of the Pacific War, and in this task Miller brilliantly succeeds.

Author Miller has justly received many honors for this book which present the US planning for response to any Japanese aggression against the United States during the period between World War I and World War II. Miller also wrote another book, "Bankrupting The Enemy" about the US economic actions concerning Japan leading up to the war that is equally high quality and required reading for World War II historians.

Outside of the plans themselves representing various schools of thought among Naval strategists, thrusters, defensivists, cautionaries, etc., the political situations in the United States with respect to limitations on military capabilities are covered thoroughly. Often the planning foundered on the reality of inadequate resources, rendering official strategy rather feckless in hindsight. Politicials were simply not up to the task of providing military preparedness, and it was not until Roosevelt was able to obtain a major naval expansion through Congress in 1937 that sufficient force would be available for a strategy for victory starting as early as 1943.

Although the author makes the case that the Rainbow-5, the last pre-war Plan Orange, was followed in the main to victory, the most disturbing element was the sacrifice of the Philippines inherent in the planning but not communicated to MacArthur or the officers or men in the Philippines. Troops were sent to the Philippines to sacrifice themselves, unbeknownst to them. Plans to relieve the Philippines were simply not realistic given the resources of the Navy, even if there had been no losses at Pearl Harbor. This is clear from Miller's book, and an indictment of the American arm-chair admirals, generals and politicians involved. This lesson went unlearned for the future, as the Army's Berlin Brigade was defenseless throughout the Cold War, and truthfully its only purpose was to die so that American public opinion could be mobilized against the Soviets.

One is ultimately led to the conclusion that War Plan Orange was successful more due to the limited options available to the planners than to any inherent brilliance in planning. The adjustments during the War such as invading the Marianas to supply a long-range bombing base tended to be more decisive than the pre-war plans. Nonetheless, Rainbow-5 provided an effective starting point and should not be underestimated.

A side point is that the author apparently does not believe that Truman would have invaded Japan if there had been no atomic bomb. As he writes, "... it is questionable that after 292,000 American deaths in all theaters of World War II, any president would have accepted carnage on that scale (of the invasion) as the only option for ending the war." Interesting point. I guess the belief the the American public can't sacrifice or has limited staying power in a conflict is alive and well. Maybe even true.

This was a superb book, well researched and well written, a fascinating story, and a valuable contribution to the political and military literature on the Pacific war, from Mahan to the outbreak of hostilities. "Orange" was the code word for Japan; the presumed cause for war with Japan was assumed to be the seizure of the Phillipines by Japan, something that had become an American fear within a short time of annexation. WPO was the plan of the American response. Over time, between the comings and goings of different staffs and factions, a vision of a Pacific War developed that comprehended the strategy and the operational needs of a Pacific campaign - fleets leapfrogging from base to base across the Pacific; mobile bases and a vast fleet train; base construction forces; amphibious forces with organic air assets - a view, adaptable to circumstances, of how to fight a vast war of movement and attrition across the Pacific basin, and a view that doomed any US forces stationed in the Phillipines and on Guam.

War Plan Orange is one of the best books on background to WW II in the Pacific Theater of war. Simply put, War Plan Orange is the blueprint the US used to win the war with Japan. Other plans could have been used that may have led to disaster, but the adoption of War Plan Orange was the key to victory in the Pacific. The Plan predicted the course of the war with great accuracy, and one must read this book to understand how that accuracy was obtained.

The book starts with an overview of the plan and its development from 1906 forward. Then a chapter is devoted to each aspect of the plan; for example, one chapter focuses on the aggressive plans desired by charismatic admirals and another chapter talks about the conservative plans developed by staff and demanded by Congress because of budget constraints. How this clash of plans was reconciled is a most interesting story.

The writing is clear and concise. Each chapter is finely focused. The various personalities and their impact on the plan are thoroughly discussed. The budgetary constraints are laid out as a key part of the planning process. Overall, the development of the plan and its impact on the war in the Pacific are described well.
Anyone who is interested in the Pacific war or WW II must read War Plan Orange. It is an easy fast read and will enhance one's knowledge of the war and of American war planning as few other books can.

AD2