* I will argue in this book that these passages—the first from Kaja Silverman’s The Threshold of the Visible World (1995) and the second from Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759/ 1790)—link sympathy and spectacle in paradigmatic form often seen in Victorian fiction. In each passage, a confrontation between a spectator “at ease” and a sufferer raises issues about their mutual constitution. In each, the sufferer is effectively replaced by the spectator’s image of himself. As examples of what I wish to call “scenes of sympathy,” these two passages, along with other scenes and texts discussed in the chapters that follow, document modern sympathy’s inseparability from representation. Inseparability both from the fact of representation in a text’s modulation toward the visual when the topic is sympathy, and from issues that surround representation (such as the relation between identity and its visible signs).
Hope this helps. John
Student or Learner