This is my opinion, which does not reflect the views of most semanticists:
Firstly, you need not ask the philosophical question of whether Sophia has volition. What counts for me is whether she is considered as having volition by the speaker at the moment of speaking. We often talk about things that don't have volition as though they do. Sometimes I say things like:
My computer doesn't seem to like this document. It refuses to open it.
Now, I know my computer doesn't really have agency in the philosophical sense, but my choice of language reveals that when I say this, I must be imagining that it does. So it can definitely be assigned the role of agent. I think it's a natural consequence of creatures that do have minds to tend to attribute minds to other things. In the case of Sophia, this tendency of ours will be much stronger, given that she is designed to have the likeness of a human mind. In fact, most things that can be said about her will probably be said with a consideration of her having agency—it would be almost inappropriate not to. Even the fact that I'm referring to her as she/her demonstrates this.
Secondly, it doesn't have to be a choice of either agent or causer, as you suggest. Why not define an agent as a kind of causer?
Again, I'm neither a semanticist nor a grammarian, so be aware that these are just my thoughts as a layman.