Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative

Butler is a difficult author to understand, particularly if you don't have a background in theories of performativity. I recommend reading JL Austin's How to Do Things with Words and Derrida's Limited, Inc either before or alongside this book. She also draws heavily from Foucault and Althusser.

Excitable Speech is powerful for its account of how subjects are formed through the address of hate speech and how, through this very address, the conditions for the subject's agency are enabled.

A previous reviewer pointed out that for Butler "the subject can only exhibit agency in and through language" and that agency in Butler's account emerges ex nihilio. This is a misunderstanding of both Butler and poststructural theories of agency in general. For Butler, agency is not produced by an autonomous actor; nor is it contained to language.

Drawing from Derrida and Bourdieu, Butler's point is that agency arises from social iterability and the fact that every re-iteration opens the potential for change and subversion. Such iteration, however, is part of the structure of signification broadly conceived (not simply language) and is not the conscious effort of an individual agent. Thus, Butler points to the effect of the body and how bodies are implicated in acts of speech and iteration.

In this text Butler is perhaps at her most cogent and most optimistic reach. I would recommend picking this up for anyone serious about theories of performativity.

Several years ago, I saw a film entitled Total Eclipse, which is a dramatization of the complex and ill-fated relationship between Arthur Rimbaud and Paul Verlaine, two nineteenth-century French poets. In one scene, a manic Rimbaud, played by the pubescently-challenged Leonardo Dicaprio, exclaims that "The only unendurable thing about life is that nothing is unendurable" (I may have misquoted this slightly; as I said, its been several years since I saw the film). As I recall, the film was rather silly by and large, although I found that this particular exclamation had the ring of solid truth (incidentally, at the time I had been an autodidactic devotee of Nietzsche's philosophy). I subsequently incorporated it into my own repertoire of pithy aphorisms, held at the ready the appropriate occasion present itself.
However, by reading Butler's Excitable Speech in tandem with a whole host of other works of a theoretical/critical sort, I came to realize that there is in fact one thing that is truly unendurable for what appears to be just about every latter-day theoretician: viz., poststructuralist discursive determinism, especially the agentless, discursively animated individual that such determinism entails. Hence Butler's insistence upon the fundamental citationality of speech, which strikes me as the continental philosopher's version of the notion of "weak voluntarism" popular among certain ethicists of an Anglo-American bent. Butler's notion of the subject's agency is certainly a qualified one, in that the subject can only exhibit agency in and through language. But nevertheless, it appears that Butler considers this deterministic influence of language to be less than rigidly absolute. Agency does not in fact emerge ex nihilo, because it is impossible to produce positive effects by using absolutely nothing. The subject must have at her disposal something with which to demonstrate her agency, because agency is observed through its effects--just as "government" [an abstraction] is manifested only through people's comportment in a manner understood to be in accordance with the principles of such an abstraction. Language is a medium as well as a matrix. However, if agency is manifested empirically, that is, through effects, then it follows that agency is a posteriori synthetic, because we observers ascribe causal necessity to the action in relation to its source, the performer of the action. Therefore, I remain uncertain as to how these effects point to a capacity for agency that is intrinsic to the subject as constitutive of the subject a priori. Perhaps the answer lies in the distinction Butler draws between "agency" and "mastery," the latter of which connotes an absolute agency which is inimical to the "weak voluntarism" thesis she advances in Excitable Speech."

The results of Butler's attempt to tackle the very serious issue of speech rights are disappointing in the extreme. With no legal background whatsoever and a myopic philosophical vision which seems ingorant of the liberal tradition upon which the right of free speech is grounded, Butler provides an obfuscted discussion (and that's all it is, a discussion) of the issue that is at the best of times, irrelevant, and at the worst of times, offensively misleading. The book is worthwhile only as an example of what happens when a postmodern thinker in the French tradition tries to tackle a subject outside the race/power/gender/subjectivity canon outlined by the philosophers of the 1960s. If you have an appetite for reading philosophical trainwrecks, then by all means read it. If you want something serious on the issue of free speech, look elsewhere.

Butler does a good job grounding speech act theory in political and legal issues, particularly racist and homophobic "hate speech." She takes Derrida's theory of iterability and shows how repetition of discourse in new contexts can be a means of resistance. For Butler, this is very applied and I liked it much better than Gender trouble.

An insightful and thoroughly researched study of the social, political, and legal ramification of not only hate speech but discourse concerning the lingusitics of hate. Butler questions the contemporary practices of the adjudication of speech which seeks to define what is correct speech and what is proscribable under law. If words are legally indistinguishable from conduct, then, Butler asks, is law not complicit in the wounds that words cause? Challenging reading