Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone

I read this as a companion piece to King Leopold's Ghost, curious to see what happened in the Congo after the Belgians left. And although it does give a very clear summary of the development of the Congolese political scene in the 1960's, that wasn't what I ultimately found most interesting about this book. No, what was truly fascinating was the insight that Larry Devlin provides in to US foreign policy in the Third World during the Cold War. Devlin shows us just how important the Congo was to the Soviet effort to expand in to the Southern hemisphere, and try to outflank NATO. While several other, minor countries had already fallen under Soviet influence by the early '60s, what Khrushchev really needed was to gain a foothold in the Congo - its natural resources, its strategic location at the heart of Africa, its significance in sheer size, could have been instrumental in gaining control over the African continent.
Devlin and the rest of the Embassy staff in the Congo soon realized just how important this apparent backwater post was, and eventually (not without a lot of prodding from Devlin and the others) Washington realized it too. But even before the folks in Washington clearly understood the situation, Devlin's mission was clear to him: he had to stop the Soviets from gaining political influence in the Congo. To accomplish this he supported an influential group of politicians known as the Binza group, and ultimately to Colonel Mobutu, who were all strongly opposed to replacing the Belgians with the Russians. This meant opposing local demagogue Lumumba and his supporters, who flirted with the Soviets and their socialist African neighbors. The support and opposition provided by Devlin and US took various forms, some of them fairly benign, such as advising and mentoring Mobutu; some of them not so benign, like providing money, weapons, and transportation to crush opposing forces; some of the downright shady, like initiating an effort to assassinate Lumumba.
This last point clearly rankles with Devlin, who goes out of his way to make it clear that he did not approve of the assassination plot, and that he did everything in his power to delay it until it for as long as possible. The question I debated for a while after I put this book down was: was he ultimately involved in Lumumba's death? On the one hand he was a CIA agent, and so perhaps one should take anything he writes with a grain of salt - there's certainly plenty of sources which still suggest he was involved. But I came away from this book with the sense that Devlin was at his core a decent man, and I believe him.
If the book has a flaw, I think it's that it's a little soft on Mobutu, who's depicted as a largely benign dictator. That just doesn't jive with anything else I've read about him.

Most of the histories of the early Congo after independence from Belgium have been written by people with a liberal slant who bemoaned the coup against Lumumba and figured that it could only happen with instigation by the US, or by Belgian sympathizers who supported Katanga. This book is a good example of that the truth of a situation is usually more complex. What most liberal histories skip over is just how unprepared the Congo was for independence. The only thing that the native residents of the Belgian Congo could agree on was their desire for the removal of the Belgians; beyond that their loyalties lay with their tribe, not any national entity. That was and still is the main problem with the Democratic Congo today.

Devlin's assertion that the US wanted Lumumba removed from power, but not to be made a martyr, is a compelling story. Those that have said that the US did more always cite unnamed sources, so until proven otherwise, Devlin's version of events is believable.

Weaknesses in this memoir:
1) If one is not familar with the timeline of events and the cast of major players in the Congo in the early 1960s, they'll probably just end up more confused. This is not a general history, just Devlin's remembrances.
2) There are large gaps in the timeline; CIA agents aren't supposed to write memoirs, so he probably thought that certain things should be left out to protect others, he should have said he was doing so.
3) Most of the personal anecdotes are interesting, but they tend to seem like filler in comparison to his recollections of dealing with the main political figures in the Congo.

If one is interested in the early years of the Congo, this is good additional reading that counterbalances some of what most of the other histories say.

Anyone who has spent as much time in Africa as Devlin did, especially in the early 60's as the colonial powers departed has a lot to talk about. Devlin does a good job going back nearly a half century to give us a much better feeling about how the richest continent on Earth in mineral wealth is also the world's basket case economically. Devlin does a great job of explaining that the Congo, which can also apply to the rest of Africa, is controlled and limited by its tribalism and not its nationalism.
Full of dozens of hair-raising situations as the Belgians fled, to be replaced by UN forces that were limited by the cold war realities of, Devlin lets us see how it really was.
This book will never be made into a movie since it doesn't attack the CIA or the US, so if you want to learn about this transition, this book is a good as it gets.

Although it may no longer be obvious today, the Congo's importance during the Cold War cannot be overstated. As one of Sub-Saharan Africa's most bountiful and powerful nations, it had significant influence over its neighbors and the US recognized the need to prevent it from falling under the sway of communism. The author served a pivotal role in ensuring this didn't happen. The book contains thoughtful insights about the conflict and its ramifications as well as thrilling tales of life and death in the unpredictable country. The result is a highly enjoyable and informational read.

I knew Larry Devlin during the late 70's when I lived in Kinshasa. He has captured the people and the environment of Zaire/Congo perfectly. I was acquainted with the successful business man, unaware of his CIA intrigues. I've read books for which the authors interviewed Devlin and wondered why he didn't write his own story. And now he has! He easily chronicles the complex Congo of the the early 60's. Conveying the timeline of elections, coups, appointments; and sorting out the Congolese gov't/diplomatic/UN personalities is daunting for most writers. But Devlin proceeds with an easy flow. His direct dealings with Lumumba, Mobutu, Kasavubu, Tshombe, and the rest are fascinating.

Larry Devlin died in Dec., of 2008. My sympathies to his family.