M1 Abrams vs T-72 Ural: Operation Desert Storm 1991 (Duel)

If you've never read much about the M-1 or T-72, this book is going to be an excellent surprise. It is well written, accurrate and provides concise summary of these two tanks. Many excellent photographs (all in color), cut-away drawings, statistics and facts support Steven Zaloga's premise...the M-1 is hands down the better tank. I always enjoy photos of the interior of tanks, this book has several for each tank.

Zaloga, who has written many books on Soviet and US armor, explains in detail how each tank was developed and how the different needs of each Army shaped the design of each fighting vehicle. The M-1 has emerged as the worlds best tank providing superior firepower, protection and mobility. It does have its flaws - it gups fuel and requires a long logistical tail. But that's ok, the US can afford that & it's well worth it to protect our crews. There are also sections of US tanker's first hand experiences during the Gulf War which demonstrate why the battle was so one sided.

Highly recommended for beginners of tank warfare or someone seeking a concise book on the armor aspect on Desert Storm. Not so much a book for modelers, although the photos will give you a lot of ideas on how crews stored their equipment. While very informative, if you know anything about either tank, there is nothing new or surprising here. It is a good buy for the money - quality paperback.

This represents one entry in the Osprey Duel series. This slender volume focuses on the tank combat in Desert Storm, in 1991. Two key tanks: the M1 Abrams on the American side and the T-72 (a Soviet-built tank) on the Iraqi side. Indeed, as the author notes at the outset, the tank combat in Iraq may have served as something of a model for what might have happened had Warsaw Pact and NATO forces engaged in combat.

Both sides in Desert Storm had significant armored forces. Outcomes in battle were a function of two factors--the ability of the tanks and the training and performance of the tank crews. Both have to be accounted for.

Early on, as with other books examining weapons systems, design, development, and technical specifications of the tanks are provided. Pages 15 and 23 provide tank to tank comparisons (although it is annoying that physical dimensions are in feet for the M-1 and in the metric system for the T-72). Then, there is a discussion of the crews. The m-1 had a crew of 4 and the T-72 of 3. American crews were, overall, better trained and better fit for field combat. Iraqi tankers tended to be rather poorly trained--a genuine hazard once combat began.

Next, the strategic thinking of the two opponents are discussed and--then--the actual fighting. The end result was a battering of the Iraqi forces. More American tanks were destroyed by friendly fire than by Iraqi tanks.

A nice brief volume on tank versus tank in Operation Desert Storm.

I have recently become a fan of books written by Steven Zaloga, however, I thought this book was just okay. I much prefer Armored Thunderbolt, which is outstanding and I also liked Zaloga's Panther vs. Sherman: Battle of the Bulge. To be fair, M1 Abrams vs T-72 is still worth reading. I had no idea that the T-72 is a poor tank (the manner in which the rounds are stored make it a death trap) and it details the reasons that the M1 is such an outstanding tank. Much like the 1991 war, the chapter on the Battle of Medina Ridge is very short and the book does not make the details of the M1 and T-72 as interesting as Armored Thunderbolt does with the details of the World War II Sherman. Armored Thunderbolt is a must buy while this book is a buy.

In Osprey's M1 Abrams vs. T-72 Ural, author Steven Zaloga concludes that, "the tank fighting during Operation Desert Storm represented one of the most lopsided contests in 20th century military history. The Iraqi army was outclassed in all respects and suffered appallingly high losses while inflicting minimal casualties on the coalition forces. In the case of the M1A1, more Abrams tanks were destroyed by friendly fire than Iraqi action." This addition to Osprey's Duel series outlines the brief contest for armored supremacy between the M1A1 tank and the Soviet-designed T-72 tank during the 1991 Gulf War. Although the outcome of the Duel is never really in doubt, the author does a superb job in outlining how design decisions and crew training shaped the eventual outcome. Throughout the volume, Zaloga's expertise in armored warfare shines, particularly in explaining the subtleties of technical points. Overall, this volume is an excellent addition to the Duel series and a worthwhile addition to anyone interested in the military details of the Gulf War.

In the introduction, while the author notes that the M1A1 had important technical advantages over the T-72 tank, he hews to his holistic view of armored warfare that he has espoused in other books: "the outcome of the tank battles of Desert Storm hinged as much on tactics, terrain, and crew capabilities as on the machines themselves." The author then delivers a well-written 14-page section on the design and development of each tank. The most interesting comments in this sections was about the American and Soviet efforts to develop new types of composite armor. The following 16-page section on technical specifications is also excellent and focuses on the key areas of firepower, protection and mobility. It would have been nice if inter-tank communications were discussed - no small point in armored warfare - but there clearly was insufficient space.

The 8-page section on the combatants was good, but a notch below the two previous sections in terms of detail and insight. For example, gunnery training for U.S. tankers is discussed, but not for Iraqis. I suspect that Iraqi tankers even in the Republican Guard had some access to sub-caliber training and probably fired a modified Soviet-type gunnery table, but this is not elaborated upon. There are some editing errors in this section as well, such as a sentence that claims that "Young second lieutenants were sent to the Armor Officer Advance Course," but it was actually the Basic Course (I graduated from AOB 7-85C, myself). Elsewhere, it is mentioned that Bravo Company 2-70 AR scored "842 out of a possible 1,000 points" but this is unintelligible. At the time, each tank fired an individual Table VIII and platoons went through Table XII, but I never heard of a company -level tank table. I think this passage was referring either to the company's mean score on these lower tables, or the personal score of Captain Mark Gerges, the Bravo Company commander. The 8-page section on the strategic situation is also good and enumerates the number of M1A1 and T-72 battalions involved in Desert Storm. There's also a couple of editorial slips in this section, too, such as adding up the number of tanks in a U.S. tank battalion (4 x 14 + 2 =58, not 55). The discussion about the interaction between the M1A1 Abrams and the AH-64 Apache attack helicopters also gives the impression that the Apaches were primarily a division, rather than a corps asset (some divisions still had AH-1s).

The 13-page section on the campaign primarily focuses on the actions of Task Force 2-70 AR at Medina Ridge. This section is interesting and well-written, but is primarily taken from Captain Gerges' account. There is only very limited perspectives provided by Iraqi tankers, although this is not surprising. The author's technical dissection of how the American M1A1s defeated the Republican Guard T-72s is first-rate. There are a couple of subtle points here that could have been a bit more elaborated upon. First, U.S. tankers were trained to identify the target while in hull defilade, move up, shoot, then back up to avoid any return fire, then repeat (Driver Move Up, Gunner take over...), but this apparently did not occur on Medina Ridge because the Iraqi T-72 rounds were falling so short of the M1A1s. Further, U.S. tank tactics normally emphasized bounding overwatch by platoons, but Bravo Company fought entirely on line. These methods worked against the Iraqis, but they might not have done so well against better-trained enemies. Second, if the Iraqis had fought like the Egyptians in 1973 and created an anti-tank screen with lots of infantry, with their armor further back, the Americans would not have been able to fight such an armor-pure battle. When the Israelis tried that, they lost two tank brigades to Saggers and RPG7s.

Graphically, M1 Abrams vs. T-72 Ural is an attractive volume that offers 3-way views of both the M1A1 and T-72M1; data tables for each tank; the view through the T-72M1 gunsight; the M1A1 gunsight view through both the daylight channel and the thermal sight; and interior turret diagrams of both tanks. It also has two maps: an operational-level map of the U.S. VII Corps attack on the Republican Guard Corps on 26-27 February 1991 and a tactical map depicting the attack of Team Bandit, 2-70 AR on Medina Ridge, 27 February 1991. A color battle scene - it almost looks like a photograph - depicts Team Bandit on Medina Ridge. The photographs in the volume are very good but several are recycled from earlier Osprey volumes. There are also numerous photos of T-72s with their turrets blown off, but not a single photo of any damaged M1A1s, even though such photos exist. The author also provides a 2-page bibliography and an index. Overall, a wonderful volume on modern armored combat, although one that could benefit from a bit tighter editing.

This book describes the two tanks in great details and then covers their confrontation in the first Gulf War. Photos from inside the tanks give excellent illustrations on not only the different design philosophies of west vs. east but also what the fighting men had to deal with in combat situations. In-depth tactical analysis explains clearly the contrasting doctrines of the opposing sides as well as the reason for the lopsided results. Overall, a must-have for military history buffs.